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1 The model
The model consists of N small open economies indexed by j 2 f1;2::;Ng. In each economy, there is an
overlapping generations of individuals who live for two periods; in each period a continuum of individuals
is born. In addition, there is a continuum of two types of ￿rms. Both types of ￿rms produce a single
homogenous good. While type I ￿rms use labor only, type II ￿rms combine each worker with a computer to
produce output. The primitives and the problems of each entity is described below.
The small open economy assumption implies that agents can borrow and lend freely at a gross interest
rate R determined in the world markets.1
To ease notation, we avoid time subscripts below since the choice problem of all generations is identical.
1.1 Individuals
An individual indexed by i is identi￿ed by a pair f￿i;￿ig, where ￿i denotes her innate ability to learn, and
￿i is a stand-in for her desire to be up-to-date with information/computer technology and/or her preference
for technological services such as the information that is accessible through the Internet (which is distinct




and [1;￿] with CDF (PDF) given by G(￿;￿) (g (￿;￿)). An individual knows her ￿ and ￿. Her lifetime
utility is given by
U = lnciy + ￿lncio + Ci (1 + ￿) ln￿i (1)
where ciy and cio denote the consumption of homogenous goods in her young and old age, respectively. The
variable Ci is a computer adoption variable takes a value of either 1 or 0; it is 1 if the individual adopts
computer, 0 otherwise. Thus, the individual can enjoy computers and its services only if her adoption choice
is unity. On the other hand, ciy and cio are continuous variables.
1The structure of ￿nancial markets in a closed economy can be easily endogenized by having agents live for three periods,
and by modifying their human capital pro￿le to ensure that agents borrow (save) in their ￿rst (second) period of life. This will
unnecessarily complicate the analysis without yielding any further insights.
1An individual is endowed with a unit of time in both periods. In the ￿rst period she has ￿raw￿human
capital that equals her unit time endowment, and she can only work in the type I ￿rm at a wage rate ￿ w.
In the ￿rst period, however, she can educate herself by investing Hi in education that increases her human
capital (e⁄ective labor) to h(￿i;Hi) > 1. It is assumed that an individual￿ s human capital is perfectly
observable to the ￿rms.
With enhanced human capital, the wage she can earn in a type I ￿rm equals ￿ w h(￿i;Hi). Alternatively,
she can train herself in computer/information technology that enables her to not only enjoy its services, but
also quali￿es her to work in a type II ￿rm that o⁄ers a wage proportional to h(￿i;Hi) (more of this below).
However, learning computer/information technology costs k(￿i;Hi).
Assumptions It is assumed that
h1 > 0;h22 < 0;h2 > 0; h12 ￿ 0: (2)
The ￿rst set implies that human capital is increasing in education but with diminishing returns. Next, the
higher the innate ability, the higher is the human capital for a given amount of education. Finally, the
returns to education are non-decreasing in an agent￿ s innate ability.
We also assume
k1 < 0;k22 > 0;k2 < 0; k12 = 0: (3)
The ￿rst set implies that the cost of adopting computer/information technology is decreasing and convex in
the amount of education. Next, it is decreasing in the individual￿ s innate ability. The last assumption on the
separability of the cost function in ￿i and Hi is not necessary and is merely done for the sake of analytical
simplicity.
It bears emphasis that the cost function k can be potentially location-speci￿c. In particular, a location
with poorer infrastructure is likely to have a higher cost. For simplicity, however, we relegate the location-
speci￿c cost di⁄erences to the ￿rms￿problem below.
1.2 Firms
All ￿rms are perfectly competitive. A type I ￿rm uses a unit of human capital to produce a unit of output.
Perfect competition then implies that ￿ w = 1.
Type II ￿rms combine each worker with a computer/IT terminal to produce output. These terminals
enhance labor productivity: each unit of human capital produces ￿ > 1 unit of output. However, set-
2ting up each terminal costs fj per period, where the subscript j captures the notion that the costs are
location-speci￿c: a location with a poorer infrastructure entails a higher cost. Under perfect competition,
an individual with human capital h(￿i;Hi) is o⁄ered a wage that equals ￿ h(￿i;Hi) ￿ fj.
1.3 The household￿ s problem
Given the wage structure, we now solve the problem for an individual located in location 1. To ease notation,
we drop subscript j below; the solution can be easily applied to any location.
The problem of an agent i is
max
Hi;ciy;cio;Ci2f0;1g
flnciy + ￿lncio + Ci (1 + ￿) ln￿ig (4)
subject to
ciy + Hi + Ci k(￿i;Hi) = 1 + xi (5a)
cio + R xi = Ci (￿ h(￿i;Hi) ￿ fj) + (1 ￿ Ci)h(￿i;Hi) (5b)
where xi denotes an individual￿ s borrowing when young. The LHS (RHS) in both (5a) and (5b) represent
expenditures (resources available) to an agent in periods 1 and 2 respectively. As is standard, to avoid trends
in variables, below we assume that R = ￿￿1.
As Ci is a discrete choice, we ￿rst solve the household￿ s choice problem separately for both Ci = 0 and
Ci = 1. Then, we compare the resulting indirect utilities to identify households who choose to adopt or not
to adopt computer/IT technology.
1.3.1 Ci = 0




ln(1 + xi ￿ Hi) + ￿ ln
￿
h(￿i;Hi) ￿ ￿￿1 xi
￿￿
(6)
The ￿rst order conditions are
1
1 + xi ￿ Hi
=
￿
h(￿i;Hi) ￿ ￿￿1 xi
h2 (￿i;Hi); (7a)
1
1 + xi ￿ Hi
=
1
h(￿i;Hi) ￿ ￿￿1 xi
: (7b)
Substituting (7b) in (7a) yields
h2 (￿i;H￿
i ) = ￿￿1 (8)
3where H￿
i is the optimal level of education when i does not train herself in computers. Finally solving for
x￿
i from (7b) and substituting it in (6) yields the indirect utility:
W￿ (￿i) = (1 + ￿)[ln(1 ￿ H￿
i + ￿ h(￿i;H￿
i )) ￿ ln(1 + ￿)]: (9)
1.3.2 Ci = 1




ln(1 + xi ￿ Hi ￿ k(￿i;Hi)) + ￿ ln
￿
￿ h(￿i;Hi) ￿ f ￿ ￿￿1 xi
￿￿
(10)
The ￿rst order conditions are
1 + k2 (￿i;Hi)
1 + xi ￿ Hi ￿ k(￿i;Hi)
=
￿
￿ h(￿i;Hi) ￿ f ￿ R xi
￿ h2 (￿i;Hi) (11a)
1
1 + xi ￿ Hi ￿ k(￿i;Hi)
=
1
￿ h(￿i;Hi) ￿ f ￿ R xi
(11b)
Substituting (11b) in (11a) yields
￿ h2 (￿i;H￿￿
i )




i is the optimal level of education when i does train herself in computers. Finally solving for x￿￿
i
from (7b) and substituting it in (6) yields the indirect utility:
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The following Lemma characterizes the choice of education as a function of innate ability. It also establishes
that for an individual the amount of education is higher if she also chooses to train in computers.
Lemma 1 Both H￿
i and H￿￿
i are weakly increasing in ￿i. Furthermore, H￿￿ > H￿:
Proof. See Section 2.1.
Intuitively, a higher innate ability increases the marginal product of education, and therefore the indi-
vidual chooses a higher amount.2 The second result H￿￿ > H￿ is due to the feature that education not only
increases one￿ s human capital, but also reduces the cost of learning computers, as assumed in (3), in case
the individual decides to train in computer/IT.
2Notice in particular that if h12 > 0, then both H￿
i and H￿￿
i are strictly increasing in ￿i.
41.3.3 The choice of computer adoption
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i solve (8) and (12) respectively. Equation (14) leads to the following proposition.





1; if ￿i ￿ ^ ￿ (￿i;￿;f)
0; if ￿i < ^ ￿ (￿i;￿;f)
Moreover, ^ ￿1 < 0;^ ￿2 < 0;^ ￿3 > 0.
Proof. See Section 2.2.
The intuition behind the results stated in Proposition 1 is simple. Given the individual￿ s preference for
technology and the market wages on a job with computers, the higher her innate ability the more likely she
is to adopt computers. The innate ability has a direct as well as indirect e⁄ect on computer learning. A
higher ability facilitates a lower computer/IT learning cost. Second, a higher ability makes her achieve a
higher level of education that also reduces her cost of technology adoption: an indirect e⁄ect.
The higher the individual￿ s (hedonic) preference for technology, the lower is the ability at which she
decides to adopt computers. A higher productivity in type II ￿rms (i.e., jobs with computers) leads to
higher equilibrium wages, thus inducing agents of lower abilities to also adopt computers and opt for working
in type II ￿rms. Similarly, a higher cost of IT investment by ￿rms lowers equilibrium wages. Then, only
relatively higher ability individuals will adopt and work on computer jobs. This is more likely to be observed
in countries with relatively poorer infrastructure.
An interesting question is: can an individual with ￿i = ^ ￿ be indi⁄erent between the two choices even
if her earnings in type II ￿rms fall below that in type I ￿rm? To answer this, ￿rst note from (14) that if
she chooses to work in type II ￿rms her education H￿￿ will be higher than had she chosen to work in a
type I ￿rm. In addition, she has to bear a cost of adopting computer/IT. However, if her preference for
computer/IT services were strong enough, i.e., ￿i is large enough such that it compensates for her pecuniary
loss, she would still choose to work in the type II ￿rm. A similar argument holds for individuals with ￿i > ^ ￿.
5Thus, the model allows for instances where an individual chooses to work in type II ￿rms even when wages
are lower, or more speci￿cally, even when wages net of cost of education and computer adoption are lower
relative to the other alternative of working in type I ￿rms.
2 Proofs
2.1 Proof of Lemma 1














￿ ￿ h21 (￿i;H￿￿
i )
￿ ￿ h22 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) ￿ k22 (￿i;H￿￿
i )
￿ 0
For the second part, assume H￿￿ ￿ H￿. Then, since ￿ > 1 and h22 < 0, ￿ h2 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) > h2 (￿i;H￿
i ). Since





i ) > h2 (￿i;H￿
i ) = ￿￿1, which contradicts (12). Hence,
H￿￿ > H￿.
2.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Fix ￿i;￿; and f. By Envelope Theorem the derivative of the LHS in (14) ￿k1 (￿i;H￿￿
i )+￿ h1 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) >
0 and that of the RHS is h1 (￿i;H￿
i ) > 0. Thus, both sides of (14) are increasing in ￿i.
To prove the ￿rst part we need to show that ￿k1 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) + ￿ h1 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) > h1 (￿i;H￿
i ). This is done
by noting that ￿k1 (￿i;H￿￿
i ) > 0; h12 > 0, and H￿￿
i > H￿
i from Lemma 1.
The second set of results is obvious from (14).
6